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MARKING UP THE BLUEPRINT
Lawrence Lokken"
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor David Bradford's paper explains how his X Tax
might work in an international context.' The X Tax, like its
cousin the Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax,2 resembles a value-added
tax (VAT) (computed by the subtraction method) in that a
firm's tax base consists of its revenues from sales of goods and
services, reduced by purchases of goods and services from other
businesses. But, the X and Flat Taxes differ from a VAT in
that they also allow deductions for wages, which are taxable to
employees. The aggregate of the tax bases of businesses and
employees is thus identical to the base on which a VAT is
imposed. Taxing wages to employees, rather than businesses,
allows tax liabilities to be adjusted according to the personal
circumstances of employees and thus permits progressivity.
The X and Flat Taxes differ principally in their treatment
of wage earners. There only are two rates under the Flat Tax.3
The rate is zero on an amount of wages equal to the personal
and family allowances ($16,500 for a married couple filing
jointly, plus $4,500 for each dependent, both figures adjusted
for inflation after 1995). For all wages above these allowances,
the rate is 19%, which also is the flat rate of the business tax.
Under the X Tax, the highest rate on wages also equals the
business tax rate. However, the X Tax, unlike the Flat Tax,
retains the present earned income credit,4 thus effectively
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1. David F. Bradford, Blueprint for International Tax Reform, 26 BROOK. J.
INTIL L. 1449 (2001).
2. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995).
3. Id. at 58-60.
4. For the earned income credit, see I.R.C. § 32, discussed in 2 BORIS I.
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providing negative rates of tax for low-income families and
some individuals. The X Tax also has a zero bracket amount
and a set of graduated rates, topping out at the business tax
rate. Professor Bradford estimates that with a business tax
(and top wage tax) rate of 28%, the X Tax, substituting for the
present individual and corporate income taxes, "could approxi-
mate the progressivity of the current U.S. income tax sys-
tem."5
As Professor Bradford points out, the X Tax, like the Flat
Tax, has the same effect as a VAT, coupled with an array of
cash allowances. For example, the Flat Tax could be mimicked
by a 19% VAT, supplemented by a cash payment by the gov-
ernment to each family equal to 19% of the family's income,
not to exceed 19% of the sum of the personal and family allow-
ances. Because the X Tax would preserve the earned income
credit and have more rate brackets, computation of the equiv-
alent cash payments is more complex, but the principle is the
same.
I comment on only two aspects of the X Tax: The choice
between an origin or destination basis for determining the tax,
and some difficulties in the international context of the transi-
tion from income taxation to X Taxation.
II. ORIGIN V. DESTINATION BASIS
For cross-border transactions, the X Tax could operate on
either an origin basis or a destination basis. On an origin ba-
sis, all sales revenues, domestic and foreign, are included in
the tax base, and deductions are allowed for all purchases,
whether from domestic or foreign suppliers. An origin-based
tax encompasses the value of all goods and services produced
in the country, regardless of where the goods and services are
consumed. On a destination basis, revenues from export sales
are excluded, and no deduction is allowed for purchases from
foreign suppliers. A destination-based system taxes the value
of all goods and services consumed in the country, regardless of
where they are produced.
Professor Bradford convincingly demonstrates that the
BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GFTS1
37.1 (3d ed. 2000).
5. Bradford, supra note 1, at 1449.
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difference between the two bases is, economically, no difference
at all, because exchange rates or prices will adjust to make
them equivalent.6 If all countries had destination-based X
Taxes, the price for a good or service would be grossed up in
each country by the tax imposed by that country. For example,
if country A's tax rate is 25% and country B's is 30% (both
rates being applied to a base including the tax), the price for
each good and service in country A would be 133% of the
pretax price (133%, less 25% thereof, being 100%), while the
price in country B would be 143% of the pretax price (143%,
less 30% thereof, being 100%).
Such a gross up cannot occur under an origin-based sys-
tem. For example, if widgets produced in country A are sold in
export transactions for $100 each, widget producers in country
B cannot sell their wares for more than $100 because country
A widgets bear no country B tax and thus can be sold in coun-
try B for the price at which they are exported from country A.
Thus, the after-tax proceeds of country A widget producers is
$75 ($100, less 25% thereof), while country B producers will
net only $70 ($100, less 30% tax). However, Professor Bradford
shows that this difference will not cause all widget production
to shift to country A because exchange rates (or prices if coun-
tries A and B use the same currency) will adjust to reflect the
differing tax rates.
However, as Professor Bradford notes, various administra-
tive aspects of the X Tax are affected by the choice between
destination and origin bases.' These and other administrative
aspects of the X Tax, and some very preliminary suggestions
for solving problems each alternative raises, are discussed
below.
A. X Taxpayers
An X Tax law must identify the persons subject to the tax,
whether it is imposed on a destination basis or an origin basis,
but this issue may be affected by the "destination v. origin"
dichotomy. The focus of an origin-based tax is on taxing all
value created in the country, and the tax should therefore
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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apply to all businesses and employees who create such val-
ue-that is, all businesses engaged in productive activities in
the country and all employees performing services in the coun-
try. Whether the firm or employee is a resident of the country
should not be relevant. Non-resident firms and employees
should be taxed on revenues and wages from domestic business
and employment, but residents should not be taxed on reve-
nues and wages from business conducted and services per-
formed outside the country.
Bilateral income tax treaties typically allow a country to
tax business profits of a resident of the other country only if
the person has a permanent establishment in the taxing coun-
try.9 A permanent establishment is "a fixed place of business
through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly
carried on."" However, an "agent of independent status" is
not considered a permanent establishment of any principal for
which the agent acts in the ordinary course of its business."
For example, if a manufacturing company of country A sells its
goods in country B, through a manufacturer's representative in
country B, acting as its agent, the company has no permanent
establishment in country B if the agent is independent in the
sense that the company does not control the details of the
agent's work and the agent bears the entrepreneurial risk of
its business. 2
Income tax treaties generally allow a country to tax wages
earned by residents of the other country for services performed
in the taxing country." However, a resident of one country is
exempt from the other country's tax on wages earned in the
9. See, e.g., OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital, at art. 7.1 (2000) [hereinafter OECD Model]. The United
States has income tax treaties, largely based on the OECD Model, with more than
60 countries. Cf. United States Model Income Tax Convention of Sept. 20, 1996,
art. 7.1 [hereinafter U.S. Model]. Most other developed countries have significant
numbers of such treaties, and some countries have many more than the United
States. Most developing countries have fewer tax treaties, and some have none.
The OECD Model provisions described in the text are found, with occasional varia-
tions in the details, in substantially all income tax treaties.
10. OECD Model, supra note 9, at art. 5.1; U.S. Model, supra note 9, at art.
5.1.
11. OECD Model, supra note 9, at art. 5.6; U.S. Model, supra note 9, at art.
5.6.
12. See OECD Model, supra note 9, commentary at art. 5, para. 38.
13. OECD Model, supra note 9, at art. 15.1; U.S. Model, supra note 9, at art.
15.1.
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latter country if the person's presence in the taxing country
does not exceed 183 days during any 12-month period, the
employer is a resident of the other country, and the wages are
"not borne by a permanent establishment" of the employer in
the taxing country.'4
These treaty restrictions on a country's taxing powers are
not consistent with the objective of an origin-based tax to tax
all value created in the country, just as they are not consistent
with the idea of a country taxing all income from sources with-
in the country. However, the restrictions derive from realities
that also would exist under an X Tax. If a foreign company has
no permanent establishment in a country, it might have diffi-
culties in complying with the country's tax laws, and perhaps
more importantly, the country's revenue authorities would find
it hard to enforce compliance. Similarly, if a foreign employee
is present in a country on a short-term assignment for a for-
eign employer, it is not realistic to expect the employee to file a
tax return in that country or the employer to withhold the
country's tax on the employee's behalf. Because the fundamen-
tal limitations on a country's ability to tax foreigners are the
same under the X Tax as they are under an income tax, an X
Tax law should contain rules similar to these treaty rules.
Since the rules are accepted widely throughout the world, their
use might facilitate general adoption of X Taxes.
The objective of a destination-based tax-to tax all goods
and services consumed in the country once and only
once-requires more emphasis on coordination. The exclusion
for export sales must not be allowed for a sale to another busi-
ness subject to the tax because the latter firm will take a de-
duction for the purchase price. Similarly, a business should not
be denied a deduction for a purchase from an X Taxpayer be-
cause the latter must include the purchase price in its taxable
revenues.
The treaty rules described earlier provide a good starting
point for defining the taxpayers subject to a destination-based
tax. The objective of taxing all consumption within the country
does not, even in theory, require taxing foreign businesses
without local permanent establishments or foreign employees
14. OECD Model, supra note 9, at art. 15.2; U.S. Model, supra note 9, at art.
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briefly present in the country for foreign employers.
B. Defining the Tax Base
Whether the tax operates on a destination or origin basis,
allocation issues arise for firms doing business in two or more
countries. Income tax treaties suggest an approach to this
issue. Under a typical income tax treaty, if a resident of one of
the countries has a permanent establishment in the other
country, the latter can tax the person's business profits only to
the extent they are attributable to the permanent establish-
ment. 5 The profits attributable to a permanent establishment
are determined as though the permanent establishment were a
separate entity dealing at arm's length with other units of the
taxpayer's business.5 For example, if X Corp. produces goods
in country A, and sells them through a permanent establish-
ment in country B, the income of the country B permanent
establishment is determined as though it purchased the goods
at an arm's length price from Xs manufacturing arm. Deduc-
tions are allowed only for expenses "incurred for the purposes
of the permanent establishment ....
Under the X Tax, these rules should apply to domestic
firms as well as foreign firms. If a resident has a permanent
establishment in a foreign country, the permanent establish-
ment should be treated as a separate foreign firm in determin-
ing tax in the resident's home country. In the example, if X is
organized and managed in country A, the division of revenues
and costs resulting from the hypothetical arm's length sale
should be used in determining the tax base in country A as
well as country B.'8
Also, whether tax is destination-based or origin-based, a
resident should be exempted from the wage tax with respect to
services performed abroad only if the wages are taxed by an-
other country. Assume a resident of country A spends three
15. OECD Model, supra note 9, at art. 7.1; U.S. Model, supra note 9, at art.
7.1.
16. OECD Model, supra note 9, at art. 7.2; U.S. Model, supra note 9, at art.
7.2.
17. OECD Model, supra note 9, at art. 7.3; U.S. Model, supra note 9, at art.
7.3.
18. This division generally is relevant only if the tax is applied on an origin
basis.
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months working for her employer, a country A company, in
country B, and the 183-day rule described above is found in
the tax laws of both countries. The employee's wages for this
period should be subject to country A tax since country B has
relinquished taxing jurisdiction. Considerations favoring the
183-day rule provide no justification for exempting the wages
in both countries. Similarly, the employer should be allowed to
deduct the wages in determining its country A tax.
Under an origin-based tax, value added by activities out-
side all countries probably is not taxed by any country. Assume
X Corp. produces goods in country A and sells them for $100 to
Y Corp. under a contract requiring X to put the goods on board
a common carrier for shipment to Y's warehouse in country B.
Y pays the common carrier (Z Corp., a country C entity) $10 to
transport the goods. If all countries tax on an origin basis, X
has revenues of $100 for country A purposes, and Y deducts
$110 ($100 cost, plus $10 shipping) in computing its country B
tax. If Z has permanent establishments in countries A and B,
some portion of its shipping fee of $10 is attributable to each of
these countries, and some of the fee may be earned by admin-
istrative activities of Z in country C. However, much of the fee
may be earned by activities outside of all of these countries,
and if the goal of the origin basis is for each country's tax to
reach value created in that country, this portion should not be
taxed by any country. If the countries tax on a destination
basis, in contrast, the entire value of the goods is taxed by
country B, where the goods are consumed.
C. Export Sales and Import Purchases
A destination-based X Tax must have rules distinguishing
excludable export sales from includable domestic sales and
non-deductible import purchases from deductible domestic
purchases. These rules should be tied closely to those defining
the taxpayers subject to the tax. The exclusion generally
should be allowed only for sales to firms that are not subject to
the country's tax, and the deduction for purchases should be
denied only for purchases from firms that are not subject to
the tax with respect to the sales.
Under the permanent establishment principle described
above, a taxpayer's transfer to its foreign permanent establish-
ment should be treated as an export sale, whether the taxpay-
2O0l] 1499
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er is a resident or is a foreign firm making the transfer from a
domestic permanent establishment. For example, if X Corp.
produces goods in country A, ships them to country B, and
sells them through a permanent establishment it has in coun-
try B, X's country A tax should be computed as though it made
an export sale of the goods, and none of the revenues from
selling the goods in country B should be included in the coun-
try A tax base. Conversely, goods and services received by a
domestic permanent establishment from a foreign permanent
establishment of the same taxpayer should be considered non-
deductible imports. In the example, the goods should be consid-
ered acquired by the country B permanent establishment by an
import purchase, and none of X's production or shipping costs
should be deductible in determining country B tax.
Additional rules are needed for cross-border sales to con-
sumers since, in this case, the buyer's status provides no clues
as to whether a sale is an export. A firm selling goods to a
retail customer should be allowed the export exclusion only if
it owns goods as they physically leave the country or transfers
ownership in a transaction by which the goods are exported.
For example, if a jeweler in country A sells a ring to a resident
of country B and the customer takes delivery at the jeweler's
shop in country A, the sales price should not be excludable
because removal of the ring from country A is not part of the
sales transaction.
For services, the objective should be to apply the exclusion
to reach results analogous to those for transactions in goods.
Generally, the exclusion should be allowed only if the benefits
of the services are enjoyed outside of the country. However, in
many cases, the place at which services are utilized is not
easily identified. If a resident of country B has heart surgery
at a hospital in country A, performed by a country A surgeon,
does the patient enjoy the benefits of the surgeon's and
hospital's services in country A or country B? If a resident of
country A places a telephone call to a resident of country B,
the benefits of the telephone company's services are probably
enjoyed in both countries A and B, but how should the reve-
nues be allocated between the two countries? Such questions
probably should be answered by a series of arbitrary rules. For
example, revenues from a telephone company's services in a
call between two countries could be allocated one half to each
country. Other cases could be governed by rules presuming all
1500 [Vol. XXV:4
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services to be utilized in the country in which they are per-
formed and considering the presumption rebutted only by a
showing that no substantial benefit from a service was had in
the country in which the service was performed.
These definitional issues do not arise under an origin-
based tax, under which a firm's tax base includes all sales
revenues, whether the purchaser is domestic or foreign, and is
allowed deductions for all purchases, domestic and foreign.
D. Administering Border Adjustments
Under a destination-based tax, there must be mechanisms
for ensuring that the export exclusion is not claimed for domes-
tic sales and that businesses do not deduct costs of import
purchases. The monitoring of exclusion claims can be facilitat-
ed by a rule that all of a firm's revenues are deemed to be from
domestic sales of goods and services, excepting only those for
which an exclusion is documented as prescribed by law. For
export sales of goods, the needed documentation could consist
of shipping or other documents showing that the goods have
left the country. For services, the documentation could consist
of a contract showing that the purchaser utilizes the services
outside the country. To monitor the denial of deductions for
import purchases, an X Tax law might borrow from value add-
ed and retail sales tax systems: (1) requiring every business
subject to the X Tax to obtain a registration number from the
tax administration and to disclose this number to all business-
es to which it sells goods or services; and, (2) allowing a busi-
ness to deduct only the costs of purchases from businesses that
have disclosed their registration numbers to the taxpayer.
This monitoring issue does not arise under an origin-based
tax since the base of such a tax includes all sales revenues, in-
cluding revenues from export sales, and deductions are allowed
for all purchases, including import purchases.
E. Transfer Pricing
Under an origin-based tax, prices must be established for
cross-border transactions between related businesses. Assume
P Corp. produces widgets in country A and sells them to its
wholly-owned subsidiary, S Corp., which imports them into
country B for sale in that country. If countries A and B tax on
an origin basis, the price in this transaction affects tax liabili-
20011 1501
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ties in both countries because P must include the price in its
country A tax-base and S is allowed a deduction for the price
for country B tax purposes. Similarly, if P sells goods produced
in country A through a permanent establishment in country C,
a transfer price must be constructed for the transfer of the
goods between permanent establishments because the value of
the goods as they leave country A is included in P's country A
tax base; while this value is a cost of the country C permanent
establishment for purposes of determining country C tax.
A company doing business in countries with differing tax
rates has an incentive to tilt the pricing of inter-company
transfers to decrease the tax base in high tax countries and
increase the tax base in low tax countries. For example, if
countries A and B both have X Taxes determined on an origin
basis, but the tax rate is 30% in country A and 20% in country
B, P Corp. and S Corp. can reduce their aggregate tax burden
by setting a low price for the goods P sells to S, thereby mini-
mizing the amount taxed by country A at 30% and maximizing
the amount taxed by country B at 10%.
Given this incentive and evidence that many companies
yield liberally to its temptations, tax administrations have
seen a need to monitor transfer prices. They have, however,
experienced considerable difficulty in doing so. The general
standard is that the price for a transaction between related
businesses should be the price that unrelated persons dealing
at arm's length would agree upon for the transaction.19 This
standard is applied easily to sales of fungible goods, for which
the arm's length price is an established market price, adjusted
for the particular circumstances of the transaction. However,
application of the standard generally is difficult in any case
involving intellectual property, whether the transfer is of intel-
lectual property, or a right to use the property, or of goods
produced or marketed with intellectual property. Intellectual
property is, by its nature, unique. Unless a company transfers
the same property or goods in substantially similar transac-
tions to both related and unrelated persons, a consequence of
this uniqueness is that there is no closely parallel market
transaction to provide a guide for determining an arm's length
19. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1986); OECD Model, supra note 9, at
art. 9.1.
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price for the company's transactions.
The recent history of transfer pricing in the United States
is, briefly, as follows: During the 1980s, increasing vigilance by
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in monitoring transfer
prices led to highly complex litigation with taxpayers that
threatened to swamp the Tax Court and yielded disappointing
results for the Service." In 1990, Congress enacted stiff pen-
alties for companies caught using transfer prices differing sub-
stantially from the arm's length prices finally determined.2
In 1994, the Treasury restated its transfer pricing regulations
as a lengthy and complex set of rules with many innovations
designed to reduce the indeterminacy often experienced by
companies and the IRS in transfer pricing matters.22 Tax ad-
ministrators in other countries have been struggling with simi-
lar problems. In 1995, the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development ("OECD") restated its transfer pricing
guidelines, eschewing the extreme complexity of the U.S. regu-
lations but recognizing that for an issue of such complexity,
simplicity in legal approach is not consistent with sound tax
administration.'
Probably, the most successful approach to the transfer
pricing problem has been the development of Advance Pricing
Agreements (APAs). These are agreements between taxpayers
and the tax authorities of one or more countries specifying
concrete procedures for determining prices for the taxpayer's
goods and services.' The APA process is expensive, requiring
taxpayers to obtain and tax authorities to evaluate elaborate
20. For example, for the first half of 1991, the U.S. Tax Court officially pub-
lished opinions in about 50 cases. Of the 921 pages of these opinions, the opinion
in one transfer pricing case consumed 184 pages. Sundstrand Corp. & Subsids. v.
Comm., 96 T.C. 226 (1991). The court found that the IRS's principal approach in
the case was an abuse of discretion, but it adjusted the taxpayer's transfer pricing
some.
21. I.R.C. § 6662(e), discussed in BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION % 79.15 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter
BITRER & LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS].
22. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1 through 1.482-8 (1986). In a June 2000 printing of
the regulations by CCH, Inc., the regulations are 81 double-column pages of fairly
small type. See B1TTKER & LORKEN, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 21, at ch. 79
(basic description of regulations; approximately 130 pages).
23. OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (1995).
24. For the U.S. APA practice, see BITrKER & LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS, supra
note 21, 79.14.
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economic studies, but at least for larger companies, the process
is generally cheaper than the alternative-litigation.
The transfer pricing problem disappears for countries
adopting an X Tax on a destination basis. Since under a desti-
nation-based tax the price received in an export sale is exclud-
ed from the tax base and the price paid in an import purchase
is not deductible, the fairness of the price for the transaction is
not relevant to any tax determination in either the exporting
country or the importing country.
F. Cross-Border Consumers
Consumers who travel and shop across borders complicate
administration of a destination-based X Tax. For example, if
individual X, a resident of country A, returns from a trip to
country B with goods purchased in country B, the general
principle of the destination basis-to tax goods and services
consumed in the country-requires that country B treat the
sale to X as an exempt export sale and that country A tax be
imposed on her purchase. Similarly, if X orders goods from a
mail order firm in country B, the firm's revenue on the sale
should be excluded from its country B tax base, and X should
be required to pay country A tax on the goods. In both of these
cases, the country A tax should be at the flat business-tax rate,
not the graduated wage-tax rates, because it is a surrogate for
the business tax that would have been imposed if the goods
had been imported into country A by a firm and X had pur-
chased the goods from the firm.
In cases such as these, border adjustments can be made by
customs authorities as the goods leave country A and arrive in
country B. For example, when X returns from her trip to coun-
try B with goods purchased there, country B tax on the pur-
chases can be refunded to her as she leaves the country, and
country A tax can be imposed as she enters that country.
In other cases, border adjustments are less feasible. If X
travels to country B to have her hair done, the value of this
service should, in principle, be taxed by country A, not country
B. Country A, not country B, is also the proper country to tax
if X purchases software, a book, or music from a country B
supplier, placing the order, making payment, and taking deliv-
ery over the Internet. In cases such as these, existing systems
provide no means for reliably effectuating border adjustments.
1504 [Vol. XXVI:4
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One can imagine an international cooperative system un-
der which a supplier could treat a transaction with a non-resi-
dent consumer as an export sale if (1) the consumer presents
an encoded taxpayer identification card from tax authorities of
her residence country and (2) the supplier transmits data on
the card and details of the transaction to the country B tax
authorities, which would relay the data to tax authorities of
the residence country, which would bill the consumer for tax.
Although this system is no more complex than an ordinary
credit card transaction, it would require a level of cooperation
and technological sophistication that has never been known in
international taxation. The requirements that the consumer
present a taxpayer identification card to the supplier and that
the supplier transmit the needed data to the tax authorities
effectively would allow either the consumer or the supplier to
opt out of the system. Nevertheless, the system may be seen as
overly intrusive into private financial matters, and the interna-
tional cooperation needed to effectuate the system may be seen
as an excessive imposition on national sovereignty.
An alternative to such a system would be one requiring
suppliers to collect tax for the purchaser's country of residence.
For example, if a resident of country A purchases music over
the Internet from a supplier in country B, the supplier, pursu-
ant to an international agreement to which countries A and B
are parties, could be allowed to treat the transaction as an
export sale for purposes of the country B tax, but would be re-
quired to pay tax on the selling price at country A's X Tax rate.
Rather than requiring the country B seller to report the trans-
action to country A, the agreement could provide for the seller
to report the transaction on its X Tax return to country B and
pay the tax to the country B tax authorities, which would set-
tle up with country A.
Without international cooperation, many types of transac-
tions, particularly Internet transactions, would tend to migrate
into tax havens in a destination-based X Tax world. Assume X
Corp., which does business only in country B, develops soft-
ware and makes an exclusive license of the software to Z Corp,
which does business only in country H, a tax haven; Z sells
copies of the software to consumers resident in country A. If
countries A and B have destination-based X Taxes and country
H has no X Tax, country B collects no tax because X's transfer
to H is an exempt export sale, and country H collects no tax
20011 1505
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because it has no tax, and tax is collected only if country A is
able to extract payment from its consumers. Although country
A is the proper country to tax in this situation, its ability to
learn of the transaction is limited.
Tax haven countries are not likely to participate in an
international enforcement regime, even if a regime along the
lines suggested above is developed. However, other countries
are not defenseless against tax havens. In the last example,
countries A and B could agree to deny the export exclusion
under their laws for transfers to country H.
Problems such as these are much less significant under an
origin-based tax. For example, if countries A and B apply the X
Tax on an origin basis, the payments received by X under the
license of its software to Z are taxed by country B, and the
prices paid by country A consumers to Z escape tax only to the
extent of the value added by Z.
G. Foreign Consumption
Under a destination-based tax, consumption occurring
outside the consumers' countries of residence should not be
considered cross-border transactions. For example, if individual
X, a country A resident, travels to country B, where she stays
in a nice hotel, eats in fine restaurants, and attends the opera,
these items should be treated as consumption in country B, not
imports into country A. Since the basic principle of the destina-
tion basis is that a country taxes all consumption occurring
within its borders, country B should not be expected to forgo
tax on the transactions. If country A taxes them as imports,
the country A tax is a second tax on each item of consumption.
Taxing some consumption twice penalizes consumers who
consume in this way without advancing any policy goal.
It necessarily follows that if X emigrates to country B,
country A should have no further claim to tax her consump-
tion, except to the extent it occurs in country A. That X may
have accumulated a substantial fortune while residing in coun-
try A and that she may pay for her consumption as a resident
of country B with income from investments in country A is not
relevant to country A's tax jurisdiction under a destination-
based tax.
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H. Business Tax Refunds
An X Tax law should include provisions for tax refunds to
businesses whose deductions exceed includable revenues, espe-
cially if the tax is destination-based. Assume P Corp. produces
goods in country A and sells one half of them domestically and
one half in export transactions; its annual sales are $1,000,
and its annual costs for wages, materials, supplies, and other
imports are $900. If country A has a destination-based X Tax,
P's deductions ($900) exceed its includable revenues (one half
of $1,000) by $400 every year. Since P's employees and suppli-
ers have paid tax on all of the input costs, lack of any provi-
sion for P's excess deductions would be inconsistent with an
essential feature of the destination basis-not taxing exported
goods and services. The law is faithful to this feature only if it
allows to P an annual refund equal to $400 times the tax rate.
Under an origin-based tax, business losses may be either
real economic losses or losses resulting from timing. For exam-
ple, if a firm increases its inventory during a taxable period or
makes equipment purchases during the period exceeding eco-
nomic depreciation on its equipment, its X Tax base for the
period may be a negative number, even if the firm is quite
profitable. For example, if P Corp., which for a normal year
has sales revenues of $1,000 and costs of $900, spends $2,000
during a particular year to replace all of its manufacturing
equipment, the deduction for the equipment purchase, added to
other deductible costs, substantially exceeds revenues for the
year, even though P may be as profitable for that year as any
other.
Under the Flat Tax, which is origin-based, business losses
can be carried forward indefinitely, but refunds are not allowed
based on losses.' This treatment of losses is appropriate if
the objective of the origin basis is to tax all value created in
the country, but it is not consistent with any conception of the
tax as a consumption tax. In the example, all of P's costs repre-
sent value created in the country, but its loss represents value
created but not yet consumed.
25. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 2, at 118.
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III. GETTING THERE FROM HERE
Internationally, a transition from the present, when all
major developed countries and most developing countries have
income taxes, to an X Tax world could be quite bumpy. Assume
country A substitutes the X Tax for its income tax, while coun-
try B retains its income tax. The change may make country A
very attractive as an investment destination for country B
residents. Income from country B investments in country A
will no longer bear source-based income taxes. If country B
taxes its residents on worldwide income, with a credit for for-
eign income taxes, the tax liability of country B investors in
country A may not be reduced by the repeal of country A's
income tax. However, withholding taxes imposed at the source
ensures that some tax is collected, even if an investor fails to
report income to her home country. Also, as country A repeals
its income tax, it presiumably also will repeal its system requir-
ing payors of income to report the payments to country A's tax
authorities. Information collected by such reporting often is ex-
changed among countries under income tax treaties.26 Thus,
country B residents, not inclined to be fully compliant with
country B income tax laws, will find country A to be a very
attractive investment destination. As a consequence,
policymakers in country B will feel considerable pressure to
move to the X Tax-even if they do not believe the change is
good policy-in order to have a tax not fatally subject to eva-
sion.
These consequences would be avoided if countries A and B
agreed to change simultaneously to the X Tax. However, such
an agreement is without precedent in international taxation.
26. See OECD Model, supra note 9, at art. 26; U.S. Model, supra note 9, at
art. 26.
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